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DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF NRC'S
THREE MILE ISLAND DECISIONS UPHELD
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Dis-
trict Courts Over Environmental Claims: The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction
over actions by citizen group plaintiffs against the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission arising out of the nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island power plant, even when the plaintiffs have not exhausted all
remedies with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Susquehanna
Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 485 F. Supp.
81 (M.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd 619 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. den.
sub. nom, General Public Utilities Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley
Alliance, 101 S. Ct. 893 (1981) (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting).
INTRODUCTION
The Three Mile Island power plant is located on an island in the
Susquehanna River near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. An accident there
on March 28, 1979, caused the shutdown of Unit Two of the plant.
The shutdown resulted in the accumulation of 600,000 gallons of
high level radioactive waste water in the reactor containment build-
ing, 250,000 gallons of intermediate level radioactive waste water in
the auxiliary buildings and tanks, and 100,000 gallons of high level
radioactive waste water in the reactor's primary cooling system. This
waste water must be disposed of before Unit Two can resume opera-
tions.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorized the
owners and operators of Three Mile Island to construct and operate
EPICOR-II, a system designed to decontaminate the radioactive
water at the Three Mile Island plant. The water treated by EPICOR-Il
was to be discharged into the Susquehanna River.
The Susquehanna Valley Alliance (SVA), a citizen's group formed
to protect the environmental quality of the Susquehanna River and
the surrounding area, filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania to enjoin the use of EPICOR-II.
The SVA feared that EPICOR-Il would be incapable of fully decon-
taminating the radioactive water and that its use would result in the
additional release of radioactive pollutants into the air and water.
The SVA's complaint set forth four substantive claims. Count I
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alleged violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)' on the basis that the NRC failed to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement regarding the use of EPICOR-I1 and that the
NRC fragmented its consideration of disposal of the contaminated
water. Count II alleged violation of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)2
on the ground that owners and operators of the plant failed to obtain
a license or construction permit for EPICOR-II. Count III alleged fu-
ture violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 3
because of the possible discharge of high level radioactive pollutants
into the Susquehanna River through anticipated failure of EPICOR-II
to adequately treat the waste water. Count IV alleged violation of
the first, fifth, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution.
The defendants4 filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause the SVA had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with
the NRC.5 The district court agreed and dismissed the SVA's com-
plaint.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on
the NEPA claim, the FWPCA claim, and the constitutional claim. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell, filed an opinion dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari. The law in the Third Circuit is
therefore, that NEPA, the FWPCA, and the United States Constitu-
tion give rise to private causes of action against administrative agen-
cies triable in the district courts when administrative remedies would
fail to prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.
DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
The Third Circuit's approach to the SVA's complaint was to re-
view the administrative and judicial scheme applicable to each of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4361 (1976).
2. 43 U.S.C. § § 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
3. 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
4. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, General Public Utilities Corporation, Metropolitan
Edison Company, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Pennsylvania Electric Com-
pany, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and several individuals in decision-making capac-
ities with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the private companies.
5. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of judicial administration that re-
quires plaintiffs to exhaust the prescribed administrative remedy before seeking judicial re-
lief. The doctrine was created to prevent premature interference with the administrative pro-
cess and to enhance judicial efficiency by allowing the administrative process to go forward
without interruption. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) and
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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SVA's claims. The issue to be decided was whether the availability of
review in the courts of appeal of the NRC's final decisions precluded
review by the district courts of non-final decisions of the NRC.
Atomic Energy Act
The Third Circuit determined that the adequacy of the NRC's
compliance with licensing or construction permit requirements under
the AEA is not reviewable in the district courts because of the review
provisions in the act itself.6 Private plaintiffs may seek redress only
through agency procedures or in the courts of appeals after the NRC
has issued a final order.7 The district court therefore properly dis-
missed the SVA's claim alleging violations of the AEA. The court also
determined, however, that the exclusive review provision of the AEA
does not prevent plaintiffs from pursuing claims against nuclear licen-
sees for other statutory violations.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The FWPCA allows any citizen to initiate a civil action on his own
behalf against any person alleged to be in violation of the act or
against any administrator who has allegedly failed to perform any
nondiscretionary act under the FWPCA.8 No district court hearing is
permitted in such an action until 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of the alleged violation to the responsible administrator.9 The
Third Circuit concluded that the district court could properly hear
the SVA's FWPCA claim because the NRC had notice of that claim
for 60 days prior to the time the court acted.
National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA requires preparation of an environmental impact statement
whenever a federal governmental agency makes a "recommendation
or report on proposals for ... major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."' 0 Enforcement of
the impact statement requirement has generally been held to be
6. § 2239 of the AEA provides for review of the NRC's final orders in licensing or con-
struction permit proceedings under the AEA in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2342.
28 U.S.C. § 2342 declares that the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over all final
orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by § 2239.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2271(c) provides that no action shall be brought for violation of the
Atomic Energy Act except by the Attorney General of the United States or by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
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within the jurisdiction of the district courts, even though no enforce-
ment provision exists within NEPA itself.' I
Private parties are permitted to intervene in all NRC licensing pro-
ceedings to raise the issue of the necessity of an environmental im-
pact statement.1 2 The NRC argued that because of this intervention
procedure the statutory scheme provided review of alleged NEPA vio-
lations exclusively in the courts of appeals. The Third Circuit found
that the NRC's interpretation could leave a gap in the protection of
plaintiffs because the appellate courts only have jurisdiction over
NRC's final orders. Before an appealable final order is issued, private
parties may be permitted to make major expenditures without con-
sidering environmental issues. These expenditures distort the perspec-
tive of the reviewing court concerning the desirability of the ques-
tioned action.' I Plaintiffs are left without an effective challenge to
such agency decisions. The Third Circuit therefore concluded that
judicial review of alleged NEPA violations was necessary before the
NRC issues a final order.
The Third Circuit determined that appellate courts may have the
power to review the NRC's compliance with NEPA through the use
of the All Writs Act' ' or by holding that any grant of a construction
permit by the NRC is a final order for purposes of review. The court
found both approaches undesirable. A factual record is often neces-
sary to determine whether an environmental impact statement should
be prepared. Jurisdiction should properly lie in the district courts be-
cause they are better equipped than the appellate courts to form the
needed record. The court also feared that the second approach would
create a proliferation of litigation over the issue of finality.
The Constitutional Claim
The Third Circuit's opinion implies that district courts cannot re-
nounce traditional jurisdiction simply because an agency may be able
to hear a claim within its proceedings.' ' Moreover, even if the ex-
11. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n. of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Scientists'
Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1981) permits any person to request initiation of commission
proceedings to revoke, suspend, modify or take other action with respect to an operator's
license.
13. This argument has not, however, persuaded the courts of other jurisdictions to issue
preliminary injunctions. See National Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649
(D. N.M. 1980) and the cases collected therein.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) as interpreted in FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S, 597
(1966).
15. The court stated, "certainly a complaint alleging a cause of action for private relief
implied from provisions of the United States Constitution states a claim within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district courts." 619 F.2d 231, 244 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
[Vol. 21
DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF NRC'S
haustion doctrine applied to constitutional claims, it would have
been waived in this case. The Third Circuit has held that the doctrine
does not apply when administrative procedures would fail to prevent
irreparable injury.1 6 The district court was held to have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in this case because the SVA alleged irreparable injury
to constitutional rights for which the NRC could not provide an ade-
quate remedy.
THE DISSENT TO THE DENIAL OF CERTIORARI
A minority of the United States Supreme Court dissented to the
denial of certiorari. The opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, di-
rectly addressed only the NEPA claim. Justice Rehnquist agreed with
the defendants' argument that Congress gave the NRC exclusive
authority to regulate its nuclear licensees and limited judicial review
of the NRC's decisions to the court of appeals. He further determined
that the United States Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, ' ' had applied this review limitation to the
NRC's compliance with NEPA.
Justice Rehnquist's primary concern was that the Third Circuit's
decision was contrary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. He feared that the Third Circuit's decision "will spawn
others like it allowing circumvention of agency review and pursuit of
NEPA claims directly in the district courts."'1  Such a review proce-
dure, Justice Rehnquist believed, duplicates administrative and judi-
cial effort and invites procedural chaos. More importantly, it leads to
premature interruption of agency processes and public interference
with agency decision-making. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the NEPA claim.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's review was limited to the narrow question of
whether subject matter jurisdiction existed in the district courts over
NEPA, AEA, FWPCA, and constitutional claims arising from deci-
sions by the NRC. The Third Circuit concluded that NEPA, the
FWPCA, and the United States Constitution give rise to causes of ac-
tion which are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
courts.
The court's analysis of the FWPCA claim is not as thorough as its
16. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1004 v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3rd Cir.
1971).
17. 435 U.S. 519, 526-527 (1978).
18. 101 S. Ct 893, 896.
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analysis of the NEPA and constitutional claims. The conditions for
jurisdiction under the FWPCA had not been met. The defendants had
not discharged any water into the Susquehanna River and the NRC
had not given permission for such a discharge. The court's analysis
therefore should properly have resulted in a finding of no jurisdiction
in the district court over the FWPCA claim.
The Third Circuit's approach to judicial review of agency decisions
allows for the flexibility often necessary in environmental cases. The
instant case, involving a threatened release of radioactive water up-
stream from a city's drinking water intake, demonstrates the neces-
sity for timely judicial review of agency decisions. The Third Circuit's
approach allows district court review of non-final agency decisions in
cases where irreparable harm is threatened. Thus, plaintiffs are pro-
vided greater protection from contested agency decisions.
The Third Circuit also allows the district court to postpone review
until further agency action is taken in cases where irreparable harm is
not threatened. The agency is allowed the opportunity to resolve the
issue first, thereby reducing premature interference with agency pro-
cesses.
Justice Rehnquist's approach would leave plaintiffs without an
adequate remedy against non-final agency decisions that remain
effective during the administrative appeal process. His approach
favors agency autonomy and places a high premium on agency exper-
tise, but fails to protect against agency decisions made without regard
to the public interest.' I
The United States Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari in
this case and to allow the Third Circuit's decision to stand upholds
NEPA's policy of reasoned decision-making. Plaintiffs must have ac-
cess to an impartial tribunal to contest agency decisions in cases
where irreparable harm is threatened and private parties are allowed
to expend large sums of money before considering environmental
issues. The Third Circuit's decision realistically addresses this prob-
lem and permits plaintiffs access to the district court to contest such
agency decisions.
PAULA Z. HANSON
19. See Slap, Fallout From Three Mile Island: Direct Access to District Court, THE
NAT'L L.J. June 22, 1981, at 29, col. 1 (quoting editorial, Philadelphia Inquirer, January
16, 1981) where the author suggests that the NRC is not adequately protecting the public
interest in the clean-up operations at Three Mile Island.
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